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1 THE FREE BANKING ERA 
While the provision of bank notes is currently a government-operated business, 
historically there have been several periods of  free banking. During the past decade 
there has been renewed interest in free banking, and the performance of  the free 
banking era has been examined from several different perspectives, t Recently, the 
first of the two alternative proposals by the British treasury for European monetary 
integration based itself on the idea of currency competit ion by giving all EC 
currencies EC-wide legal tender status. 
Three major themes are present in the extant literature: (i) sustainability, 
(ii) uncertainty and information, and (iii) circulation, debasement (inflation) and 
seigniorage. The first theme arises because the debate about the effects of deregu- 
lation of the money supply process is in essence an argument about sustainability; 
that is, whether a single supplier of money can remain the sole supplier of currency 
when competitors are free to enter the money supply process. In the Scottish case, 
for example, White (1984, pp. 25-26) argues that when the Bank of Scotland lost 
its monopoly rights it was unable to thwart entry. The second theme addresses 
the argument hat the era of  free banking in the United States led to more 
uncertainty about the value of different bank notes in comparison with the pre 
free-banking era. 2 There is ample evidence that during the free banking era the 
* We are grateful to J. Carlson, D. Jansen, R. van der Ploeg and the referees for their stimulating 
comments, to L.T. Gordon of the Krannert Economics Library for providing the data, and to 
J.G. Song for his able computational ssistance. 
** Pennsylvania State University, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, and Erasmus University/Tin- 
bergen Institute Rotterdam, respectively. 
1 One focus has been largely normative in spirit, and coincides with the current interest in 
deregulation; see the provocative ssay by Hayek (1978), and the volume edited by Salin (1984). 
Another line of research as focused on positive implications of free banking; see the early perceptive 
analysis by Klein (1974), and the review article by King (1983). In addition, several interesting 
empirical studies have been conducted. For example, Rockoff(1974) and Rolnick and Weber (1983, 
1984) have investigated the free banking era of the United States, while White (1984) has conducted 
a detailed study of the Scottish experience. 
2 See, for example, Rockoff(1974, p. 143) and Friedman (1959). 
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nonbank public had imperfect information regarding the alternative bank notes 
and their relative values. Lastly, some have argued that the private provision of 
money may reduce inflation, since competition would provide a check against 
overissue; others have argued the converse, see Klein (1974). Currency com- 
petition as a means to hold inflation down is the leitmotif of the British treasury 
proposal. 
While the existing literature'offers alternative models that address each of these 
issues separately, a single coherent framework that integrates the three issues is 
notably absent; see Fischer's (1986) review essay and King (1983, p. 156). The link 
between theory and empiricism has been especially weak; only the hypothesis of 
wildcat banking has been investigated empirically. In his study of free banking in 
the U.S., Rockoff (1974) notes that a number of free bank failures are related to 
the possibility of wildcat banking. Rolnick and Weber (1983, 1984), however, aise 
the alternative falling asset prices explanation. This is contested by Rockoff 
(1989), who argues that asset prices fell precisely because banks had to sell off 
assets in case of a bank run. While the falling asset hypothesis may explain a 
portion of bank closures, it would still leave unexplained some 85 percent of the 
behavior of free banks. 
The absence of theoretical models for the free banking era not only obscures 
discussions about he merits ofprivatization ofthe money supply process, but also 
hampers the empirical analysis as it is unclear what hypotheses are to be tested. 
The aim of the present paper is to develop an analytical framework that captures 
themes (i)-(iii) and to test the predictions of the model based on data from the 
free banking era in the United States. 
We begin by noting that the key difference between a government-run central 
banking system and the free banking system is the difference between amonopoly 
and an oligopoly model. Hence, we face the difficult task of selecting an appro- 
priate oligopoly model. Toma (1985) has modeled the rivalry between the U.S. 
Federal Reserve and Treasury in the 1930s and 1940s as a duopoly quantity game. 
In Toma's model, each institution could reap part of the total seigniorage, by 
determining their share in the supply of high powered money. The analysis is cast 
in a Cournot-Nash setting where the two institutions compete for their share in 
the supply of the U.S. monetary base. Given the institutional background of that 
time, the respective shares of base money are the appropriate strategic variables. 
In contrast, during the free banking era different dollar bills were issued by 
different banks? These bank notes (inside money) were redeemable in specie, 
which functioned as the monetary base (outside money). Due to temporal differ- 
ences in circulation and debasement rates of the different notes, see section 3 
below, these notes did not exchange at par in the market place. 4 Different 
3 The notes were distinguishable y the imprinted brand names. 
4 This may not have been the sole reason for the discounts. For example, the distance between the 
place of exchange and the location of a bank implicitly determined the transaction costs of arbitrage 
as the cost of transportation. 
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debasement rates represented different default risks, see e.g. Rolnick and Weber 
(1987, pp. 4-6) and Rockoff (1989, pp. 39-40). This gave rise to risk premiums 
in the form of discounts charged by brokers, see Rockoff (1974, p. 144). It follows 
that when alternative notes coexist, informed agents are not indifferent between 
the notes if the debasement rates differ. Differences in debasement rates trigger 
substitution towards holding the notes with lowest rate of debasement (inflation). 
Therefore, we focus on an oligopoly in the bank note supply process under 'price 
competition,' rather than 'quantity competition,' where debasement rates are the 
strategic variables. If the nonbank public were perfectly informed, this would 
trigger 'price wars' to capture the entire market, see Friedman (1959, p. 7) and 
Klein (1974, p. 430). Given the costly services of currency brokers and bank note 
reports, however, it is unlikely that all of the nonbank public was perfectly 
informed about he rates of debasement of the alternative suppliers of bank notes. 
Hence, some agents would accept particular notes even if such notes circulated 
above the lowest rate of inflation. This implies that if the minimum debasement 
rate is very low, a supplier of notes has an incentive to debase rapidly. This occurs 
if the lost demand ue to agents witching to the notes of another supplier is more 
than offset by the inflation tax which is levied on the uninformed agents. There 
are therefore two opposite forces at work: the incentive to debase slowly in order 
to attract he fraction of note holders who are informed about the debasement 
rates, and the incentive to debase rapidly to exploit the uninformed public. We 
show that these two forces preclude the existence of pure strategy equilibrium 
debasement rates. It is shown, however, that an equilibrium in mixed strategies 
does exist. 
The upshot of our analysis is that the equilibrium strategies are intrinsically 
stochastic, thus implying that the individual bank note circulation and debasement 
rates are random over time. However, this source of uncertainty is more a virtue 
than a vice. While Rolnick and Weber may have refuted the wildcat banking 
hypothesis, the general belief persists that the era of free banking exhibited more 
uncertainty. This vice is precisely what is implied by the mixed strategy equili- 
brium, as it implies uncertainty as an equilibrium phenomenon. But, in contrast 
to the monopoly provision of bank notes, it has the virtue of producing lower rates 
of debasement and hence lower inflation. In order to derive these conclusions a
model of free banking is developed in the next section. 
2 A MODEL OF FREE BANKING 
We begin by specifying the demand for money, and describing the technology for 
issuing bank notes. The money demand functions are based on the quantity 
equation MV = PT)  Let k be the money multiplier, which is assumed to be 
5 It is not our aim to develop a model which explains why money is used at all, but to model the 
demand for different monies which are all legal tender. Therefore we adopt one of the most widely 
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constant. The relationship between bank notes B and money demand M, i.e. notes 
and deposits, thus becomes M = kB. We employ Cagan's (1956) specification for 
velocity, so that V = exp(?i), 7 > 0, where the nominal interest rate i equals the 
real interest rate r plus the debasement rate n. Furthermore, we assume a fixed 
relationship between real income and transactions: T = T(y) .  It follows that the 
demand for bank notes deflated by the price level P is 
r 
b = _B = __T(Y) e -  ~(r+ ,~) 
P k 
Following Toma (1985), we focus on situations where the real income y and the 
real interest rate r are exogenous to the model. In this case, the demand for 'real 
notes' can be written as 
b = ~e - r= , (1) 
where ~p = ~b(y, r) -- T(y)  e - ~r/k depends only on y and r, which are assumed to 
be fixed. 
Equation (1) is a reasonable specification of the demand for real notes supplied 
by one source. During the free banking era, however, several banks issued distinct 
dollar bills, and one must modify the equation (1) to incorporate interdependencies 
in the demand for the notes. This is done by allowing for currency substitution, 
or more appropriately note substitution. In particular, we will argue that a sepa- 
ration in information causes some agents to substitute actively, while others 
remain indifferent. For the period of the antebellum a partition in information, 
such that some agents were better informed than others, seems natural given the 
cost involved in gathering information about debasement rates. In equilibrium the 
number of agents involved in collecting information and engaging in arbitrage is 
such that the marginal benefits from arbitrage just offset the cost of acquiring the 
information, see e.g. Grossman and Stiglitz (1976), and more specifically Rolnick 
and Weber (1986). For the period of free banking, the nonbank public can be 
divided into two classes: those who were informed about he debasement rates of 
alternative note suppliers and those who were uninformed about the alternative 
debasement rates. The former class is comprised of brokers of bank notes and the 
users of bank note reports. For the latter class, comprised of agents primarily 
involved in local trade, the costs of gathering information exceed the benefits, see 
e.g. Rockoff(1974, p. 145) and Klein (1974). It is assumed that the informed wish 
to hold the notes of the bank that debases at the lowest rate, see e.g. Klein (1974, 
pp. 432-433), signaling the lowest risk of default, while the uninformed simply 
used specifications formoney demand, which is also often used in the currency substitution literature, 
see e.g. Kouri and De Macedo (1978). Note that Blanchard and Fischer (1989, chapter 4) employ 
the same strategy for addressing these two different questions. 
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hold the ' local'  currency. Hence, each bank enjoys some positive demand for its 
notes from its share of the uninformed. In addit ion, extra demand material izes if
it debases at the lowest rate. In this manner ,  direct note substitution occurred 
whenever another bank would become the bank with the lowest rate of note 
creation. 
The impact of  informed and uninformed agents on the demand for real notes 
is modeled by means of two multiplicative scale factors, e , /?  such that e >/3. 
Suppose there are n banks indexed by i, j = 1 . . . . .  n. Define the following generic 
scale factor zi: 
{ ~ if  ~i < rcj V j # i 
z i = (2) 
fl if rc i > nj for some j :/: i .  
If T, T < n, banks simultaneously set the lowest inflation rate, it is assumed that 
z; is a weighted average of ~ and f16 Given this definit ion of z~, the demand for 
mint i 's real notes is given by 
b i=  zidpe -~''~', i=  1 . . . .  ,n .  (3) 
Intuitively, if bank i has the lowest debasement  rate, it gets all of  the informed and 
its share of the uninformed, and z~ = ~. If  the bank does not  have the lowest 
debasement  rate, it loses the informed to the bank with the lowest debasement  rate, 
and zi takes on the smaller value of ft. Thus  the difference (c~ - /~)  is the note 
substitution factor by which demand increases when a bank sets the lowest 
inflation rate. In addit ion to this direct note substitution process, some smooth and 
more indirect substitution process may be present as well. 7 Fol lowing Kouri  and 
De Macedo (1978) equation (3) is amended as follows 
b, = zidpe - ~'''+ ~ (3 ' )  
where re* is the lowest debasement rate among the other free banks.  The semi- 
elasticity a signifies the amount  of indirect note substitution, while zi in (2) gives 
the amount  of direct note substitution. Below we investigate the cases where a = 0 
and a > 0, z,. constant  and zi as defined (2). 
6 In particular, inthis instance we assume z i = [c~ + (T - 1)fl]/T. This assumption is consistent with 
the following interpretation f ~ and ~: Let I be the number of informed note demanders, and U the 
number of uninformed note demanders per bank. Then if rt < rtj Vj 4= i, bank i gets ~ = I + U 
customers, while the other banks get only their share of the uninformed, namely fl = U. When Tbanks 
tie for the lowest debasement rate, they share equally the informed note demanders, and l IT + U 
customers are serviced by the banks that ie for the lowest debasement ra e. Given this interpretation 
of ~ and fl, manipulation reveals that l IT + U = [~ + (T - 1)/~]/T. Thus ~ and fl reflect he positive 
scale effects of using the same currency. 
7 We are grateful to a referee for raising this issue, and to R. van der Ploeg for discussion on this 
point. 
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The supply of bank notes derives from the presumed seigniorage maximization 
by each individual bank. 8 For simplicity we detach the provision of money 
business from the other banking activities provided by the banks, i .e. we assume 
that the profit function is separable in the two services. Furthermore, we assume 
that the cost of maintaining the stock of notes exhibits decreasing average costs 
due to increasing returns to scale over the relevant range. 9 Several scale factors 
may be identified: ( i )some fix6d costs are incurred in maintaining the stock of 
notes; (ii)with sufficient cross sectional independence in the agents' stochastic 
demand for redemption, the specie reserve ratio can decrease with the size of the 
bank due to Arrow and Lind's diversification argument, see King (1983, p. 133); 
and (iii), as argued by Friedman (1959, p. 7) the value of the notes must be above 
marginal cost to 'prevent' the return to a commodity standard. For simplicity, 
these costs K~, not necessarily equal for each bank i, are assumed to be constant. 
Following Friedman (1953), Bailey (1956) and Toma (1985), and assuming 
perfect foresight, the revenue from the provision of money equals the inflation or 
debasement rate n,. times the real base demanded b~, i .e. the 'inflation tax.' Hence, 
the seigniorage function of the i-th 'mint' is given by 
S i = rcib i - K i (4) 
In combination with equation (3), or (3')  the revenues are positive for all inflation 
rates, and negative in the case of deflation. For K/sufficiently small and given some 
rr*, seigniorage is positive over some rangeas  well. The problem of the ioth mint 
is to maximize S e by choosing an appropriate n,.. 
The purpose of the paper is to investigate several solutions to the maximization 
problem of the banks. The standard case of a single central bank is represented 
by equations (3) and (4) with z e fixed. Maximizing S~ with respect to n; yields 
Bailey's (1956) seminal result rr; = 1/7. I n te r  a l ia ,  note that as rr; increases beyond 
1/7, 5',. decreases; this was dubbed the Laffer curve property by Blanchard and 
Fischer (1989, chapter t0). Turning to multiple note suppliers, it is evident that 
a cartel of free banks would also implement he monopoly solution rr i = 1/7. 
Consider, instead, what happens if there are several competing free banks. Two 
cases will be investigated: (i) z; fixed, and (ii) z~ as specified in (2). As it turns out, 
these assumptions about zi generate solutions which are qualitatively different 
from each other. In contrast, whether the other substitution parameter a is zero 
or positive only makes a quantitative difference. 
8 The actual note supply process during the free banking era was as follows. A free bank deposited 
an amount of bonds with the state auditor in return for which bank notes were printed and could 
then be issued. Observe that his process could be repeated by buying new bonds in the market place 
in return for those notes. This possibility generated the different circulation rates, see e.g. Rolnick 
and Weber (1987, pp. 4-6) and Rockoff (1989, pp. 39-40). 
9 The issuance costs like the purchase of printing plates are essentially sunk costs, but the 
maintenance osts are recurrent. 
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Start with the assumption that z; is fixed, i.e. each free bank is assured a fixed 
segment of the market. Just how many notes each segment wants to hold is 
determined by the own debasement rate 7z i and the own semi-elasticity 7, the 
opportunity costs re* and its semi-substitution elasticity o" > 0, cf. equation (3) or 
(3'). Adopting the Nash-Cournot solution, i.e. taking the other debasement rates 
as given, yields again n; = 1/3'. The similarity between the monopoly and oligopoly 
solutions derives from the exponential format of the demand equations (3) and 
(3 ' ) .  'o 
The solutions derived up to this point rely on the assumption that the demand 
side is equally uninformed, and hence substitution between notes occurs only 
indirectly. Consider what might happen if some segment is better informed than 
the others such that zi follows (2) instead of being fixed. Is inflating at 1/7 still a 
viable strategy? 
Let there be n free banks participating in the money supply process. ~ The 
informed agents favor the 'good' money over the 'bad' money, i.e. prefer low 
debasement rates, and the low inflation notes experience a discrete demand 
advantage. Hence, it pays for a particular bank to 'undercut' he other banks if 
the other banks are debasing at rate 1/7. By debasing at a slightly lower rate the 
bank loses some revenue on each note issued, but this loss is more than compen- 
sated for by the discrete jump in demand through the informed (higher ~). In fact, 
this type of'deflationary war' destroys pure strategies for any rc i ~ [s, t/y], where 
s < 1/7 is the lower bound debasement rate such that 
S,(=,. = s I z; = or = S;(rc; = 1/3'1 ~; = B)- 
If, however, one or more competitors choose n* = s, a bank is better offby inflating 
at ni = I/3'. The reason is that, if multiple banks charge the lowest debasement rate, 
they must share the informed note demanders. With ties at s, the gain from the 
switch to 1/3, more than outweighs the loss in demand, c.f. equations (2) and (3) 
or (3'). It follows that no n; ~ [s, I/7] can be a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. The 
intuition behind this result is as follows. Throughout he interval Is, 1/7 ], com- 
petitive forces exert deflationary pressure on n,.. But at the lower bound s, the 
incentive to exploit one's monopolistic power over the uninformed becomes 
dominant. This renders any pure strategy non-viable. What is needed is a strategy 
such that the two forces - competitive and monopolistic - exactly offset one 
another for all n;~ [s, 1/7]. Such a strategy is the mixed strategy, where the ni's 
10 We are grateful to a referee for inducing us to treat his oligopoly solution, and to Rick van der 
Ploeg for extensive discussion on this point. 
11 While entry was free in principle, the free banking act of Ohio, which is considered in the 
empirical section, resulted in limited entry only. In effect, the number of free banks can be taken as 
fixed after the first year of the enactment ofthe law, see Huntington (1964, p. 210). With free entry 
n is endogenous and seigniorage is driven to zero, but the qualitative properties of the Nash 
equilibrium remain the same. 
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are chosen at random from a particular distribution function. By randomizing the 
debasement rates, a bank precludes its rivals from being able to systematically 
undercut its own debasement rate. 
The symmetric mixed strategy Nash equilibrium for the above game is derived 
as follows. Define the profits for the i-th bank, which depend on whether it 
experiences the scale benefits, as: 
t 
{Wi(rr ) if zi= a,  
S,.= L~(~r) if z i=f l .  
(5) 
Recall that z,. = a if bank i sets the lowest debasement rate, while z; = fl if some 
bank other than i sets the lowest debasement rate, and ct > ft. Suppose all other 
j, j # i, and j = 1 . . . . .  n -  1 say, banks employ a mixed strategy and set it/ 
according to a distribution function Fj0r_/) = FOr), for all j. Hence, with proba- 
bility: A(n) = (1 - F(n))" -  ~ the i-th firm debases at the lowest rate and captures 
the scale benefits ct. With probability: 1 - A (~r) it does not inflate at the lowest rate 
and experiences a scale effect on the demand side offl  < a.~2 Assuming that the 
i-th firm employs a mixed strategy with distribution function F~(n) in the support 
Is, m], its expected seigniorage is
Is m ES; = {A(r0 Wi(n) + (I - A(x))L;(n)} dF,(x).  (6) 
The objective of the i-th bank is to maximize ES;by choosing dF;(n) appropriately. 
We will show that the distribution function (mixed strategy) 
Fi(rO = F(n) = 1 - A (n)  l/C'- 1) with support Is, m] ,  
such that 
A(zc) Wi(n ) + (1 - A(1t))Li(n) = Ci,  (7) 
where C; is a constant such that C i = L i (m ), m = l/y, and Wi(s) = Ci implicitly 
defines s, comprises a Nash equilibrium to the above game) 3 To see intuitively 
why this comprises a Nash equilibrium, we note that A and 1 - A just balance W 
and L for each n in the support. 
12 Note that with an absolutely continuous distribution F(n) the case zr i = ~r: of ties described in 
footnote 6has probability zero. Therefore, this happenstance is not defined in equation (5), as it will 
play no role in equation (6). 
13 A similar equilibrium ay be found in Varian (1980) and Baye et al. (1992) who describe the 
complete set of equilibria for a similar game. Interestingly, however, note that here the upper bound 
m is derived endogenously rather than being imposed exogenously. 
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In order to verify formally that this indeed constitutes the symmetric Nash 
equilibrium, we must show that if all banks use this strategy, no individual bank 
has an incentive to deviate from the strategy. Moreover, as the equilibrium 
involves randomized strategies, we must verify if F(n) defined above is a well- 
defined distribution function. We begin by verifying the latter, and then demon- 
strate that no firm has an incentive to use an alternative strategy. 
In order to show that F(z~) is well defined, derive an explicit expression for A (n) 
from equation (7) while using (5), (4) and (3): 
A(n)= # [meT(~-m) -  I]. (8) 
~-/~Ln 
Calculations for the case a > 0, i.e. using (3') instead of (3), are presented in the 
Appendix as the qualitative properties of the solution are the same under either 
specification. Note that A(n) is continuous in n and that knowledge of A (n) is 
equivalent to knowledge of F(n), since F(n) = 1 - A(n)  1/~n- l). For F(n) to be a 
well-defined istribution function, A (n) must exhibit he following properties: (i) 
A(s)  = 1, and A(m)  -- 0, (ii)A(n) is a monotone and nonincreasing function, and 
(iii) A(n) is right continuous. Evidently, A(m)  -- 0 from equation (8). As A(n) = 
[L;(m) - L;(n)]/[ W,.(n) - L;(n)] from (7), the implicit definition ofs through the 
equation W(s) = L (m)  implies that A (s) -- 1. This manipulation also reveals why 
Ei(n) = F(n) as the Kj cancel in the numerator and denominator fA (n). To show 
that s is well defined, set A(s )= 1 in equation (8). Taking logarithms, this 
equation can be rewritten as 
1 - 7s = log(fl/aT) - logs. (9) 
It is clear that this equation has a unique and nondegenerate solution 0 < s < 1/7, 
due to the fact that fl/a < 1. Hence property (i) is satisfied. Next, differentiate A (n): 
,10, 
dn ~ fl 
which is negative for n < 1/7. Therefore, A(n) is monotonically decreasing on its 
support, and property (ii) is satisfied. Clearly, property (iii) is satisfied as well, as 
A (n) is continuous in n. It follows that F(lt) is a well defined istribution function. 
Next, we verify the mutual best response property. Note that for any debase- 
ment rate n,. such that s < n~ < m, the i-th firm has no incentive to choose a strategy 
different from the strategies F(n) used by the other firms, as the payoffs (7) are 
constant. Thus the integrand in (6) is constant and hence varying F~(n) does not 
improve expected seigniorage on the interval [s, m]. Can the i-th bank gain by 
allocating some probability mass outside the interval [s, m] ? We already noted 
that S; exhibits the Laffer curve property and is decreasing for any n,. > 1/7. 
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Therefore, no bank will ever inflate at a rate above 1/7, as it can always make the 
same seigniorage Li(n ) for an appropriately chosen n < 1/7, and still have a 
chance to make W,.(n). Alternatively, the chances of earning W,.(n) are zero for 
> 1/7, and hence the firm should not inflate at a rate above the monopoly rate. 
Similarly, it does not pay to inflate at a rate below s, as Wi(n) < W~(s) for n < s. 
In summary, it does not pay to deviate from A(r0 in (8). To conclude, it follows 
that F(n) is indeed the symmetric Nash equilibrium mixed strategy. The next 
section investigates the properties of this mixed strategy equilibrium, the other pure 
strategy equilibria, and attempts an empirical evaluation. 
3 IMPLICATIONS AND EMPIRICAL TESTS FOR THE CASE OF OHIO 
Prior to the free banking era in the United States, banks enjoyed local monopoly 
power. For example, Huntington (1964, pp. 195, 267) reports for the case of Ohio 
that the number of banks were explicitly limited by law for each county. Moreover, 
the amount of dollar notes each bank could issue was limited by a reserve ratio 
and the limitations on the capital stock, see Huntington (1964, pp. 196-197, 
267-269). However, free banking laws, such as the one of Ohio in 1851, chal- 
lenged the monopoly power of existing banks by allowing entry. By 1852, 
18 percent of all banks in Ohio were free banks. A major factor behind entry was 
the excess demand for (local) currency, especially in the frontier egions, Hunting- 
ton (1964, p. 208). This meant that an entrant could profitably secure some 
demand, by competing with the (faraway located) incumbent monopolist. 
Rockoff(1974, 1989) and Rolnick and Weber (1983) note that, while the period 
of free banking exhibited more uncertainty than before, instabilities were not 
prevalent. Competitive pressures, as feared by Friedman and Klein, and mono- 
polistic power together 'destabilize' pure strategy equilibria. We showed, however, 
that an appropriately chosen mixed strategy balances the two destabilizing forces. 
Hence, uncertainty in our model is an equilibrium phenomenon, rather than being 
the sign of destructive competition. The following proposition links this endo- 
genous uncertainty with debasement. 
Proposition I 
A free banking oligopoly with asymmetric nformation, such that some agents are 
aware of the debasement rates associated with the distinct dollar bills, while other 
agents are uninformed, implies stochastic debasement rates for strategic on- 
siderations. However, these debasement rates are below the debasement rate 
which is generated by a monopoly bank or the solution for the oligopoly when no 
agent is informed. 
Proof 
In the previous section it was argued that the monopoly bank chooses 
= 1/7 = m. Moreover, the oligopoly of competing free banks, with or without 
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inclusion of opportunity costs (a = 0 or tr > 0), but without direct note substitution 
(z; independent of the 7r; and the rcj's), also sets re; = I/7 = m. Because F(m) = 1, 
F(m - e) < 1 for e > 0, and f(rc) is continuous, the competitive banks under 
asymmetric nformation (with direct note substitution) almost surely inflate at a 
rate below m. 
From this, it is straightforward to derive the following implication. 
Corollary I 
The monopoly seigniorage and oligopoly seigniorage for the case without direct 
note substitution is above the expected seigniorage with direct note substitution. 
Moreover, direct note substitution introduces (additional) randomness vis-?~-vis 
the other equilibria. 
Proof 
Since rc = 1/7 for a monopolist bank, the monopolist earns seigniorage 
[7 + (n - 1)fl] 7- z~ be- l + ,/~ _ K. The oligopoly without direct note substitution 
makes [0c + (n -  1)fl] 7 -~e-~+~/~-  nK; i.e. has the same total return as the 
monopolist but higher costs. The free banking oligopoly solution with direct note 
substitution, though, generates lower returns as total expected seigniorage equals 
nil),- ~ c~e - i a - nK, where the factor a < e "/~ is defined in the Appendix (note that 
a = 1 if tr = 0). Evidently, the randomness in the seigniorage of free banks derives 
from the randomness in rce and ~;. 
The proposition and corollary unite the three themes of free banking. Given 
multiple suppliers of bank notes with declining average costs and asymmetric 
information on the demand side, equilibrium involves mixed strategies. As a 
consequence, debasement rates and seigniorage are random. But if no segment of 
the public is informed, then the pure strategy solution rc = 1/7 is implemented. The 
tradeoff being lower uncertainty against higher inflation. These opposite pre- 
dictions can be confronted with data to sort out which theory is supported. At the 
informal level the asymmetric information model seems consistent with the general 
notion that the free banking era constituted a period of higher financial uncer- 
tainty. While Rockoff(1974), Rolnick and Weber (1983, 1984) mention the general 
notion of increased uncertainty, they also note that in most states 'the free banking 
law proved reasonably successful,' Rockoff (1974, p. 142). This, again, is in line 
with the asymmetric information model of free banking. The uncertainty is an 
equilibrium feature; if each bank indeed employs the above mixed strategies the 
banking industry should exhibit stability, in terms of the number of banks that 
operate. Stability is also present in the sense that free banking does not lead to 
runaway inflations, as feared by Friedman (1959, pp. 6, 7), because the average 
inflation rate under free banking is below the optimizing inflation rate of a mono- 
polist. 
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The empirical predictions implied by the proposition and corollary offer 
interesting possibilities for conducting formal tests of hypotheses. Fortunately, 
some data are available for the free banking era. We begin our empirical investi- 
gation by confronting the corollary with data on seigniorage gains. Corollary 1 
suggests that, regardless of the information structure, the monopoly rents from the 
provision of money should diminish under free banking, due to entry. Table 3 in 
Rockoff (1974) lends some support o the Corollary 1. The average seigniorage 14
as a fraction of net worth is consistently higher in Philadelphia, which did not 
allow for free banking, than in the free banking cities of New York and Boston. 
While the prediction that seigniorage under free banking is lower than under 
monopoly supports the corollary, virtually any theory of the industry predicts that 
entry lowers profits. In this respect, the randomness of debasement and 
seigniorage is the more interesting feature of the proposition and corollary, as this 
separates the asymmetric nformation model with direct note substitution from the 
model without informed agents and only indirect substitution. We will focus on 
the case of Ohio for which reliable data on the money supply are available from 
Huntington (1964) to try and discriminate between the two models. 
From 1846 to 1851 three types of banks existed in Ohio: Old Banks which were 
a remnant of past legislation, State Branch Banks which had insurance similar to 
the current FDIC, see e.g. Calomiris (1990) and Independent Banks which were 
bond secured. Prior to 1851, entry to each type of Bank was limited, see 
Huntington (1964, pp. 195, 267). Each bank provided their own dollar bills, and 
apart from the central banking aspect, they also conducted the usual commercial 
banking business. In 1851 a free banking law was passed, allowing for entry by 
free banks, see e.g. Ng (1988, p. 880), conditional upon certain solvency and 
liquidity requirements. ~5This system was in existence until 1863. Huntington 
(1964, p. 298) presents a figure which depicts the ratio of the amount of bank notes 
which were circulated by each type of bank to the amount of its capital. From the 
figure it appears that the ratio becomes much more volatile after the institution of 
free banking in 1851, thus corroborating the prediction of the model that free 
banking leads to increased uncertainty. 
Given the institutional arrangements at that time we take it that the 1846-1851 
period was more or less a period of limited competition in the bank note supply 
process, while the entry of free banks lead to enhanced competition during the 
1852-1863 period. On the basis of proposition 1 and given the fact that some 
agents were well informed through the use of bank note reports, one expects the 
second period to have exhibited more uncertainty due to the mixed strategy 
14 Seigniorage h re refers to distributed dividends, which also include profits from the commercial 
banking activities. Dividends are of course only an imperfect measure of seigniorage. 
15 Ohio law required that banks of the same type must receive the notes of each other at par, see 
Huntington (1964, pp. 209, 269, 272). This perfect substitutes condition implies that bank notes 
issued by different banks of the same type can be considered quivalent. For this reason we will focus 
on the aggregate note supply by each type of bank. 
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solution. In order to conduct astatistical test to discriminate between the pure and 
mixed strategy solutions, Table 1 gives the means and variances for the circulation 
to capital ratio, for each type of bank over both periods. The variances eem to 
increase after the deregulation, while the mean rates drop. Formal tests of hypo- 
thesis are reported in Table 2. Let index p refer to the era prior to free banking, 
and let the index f denote the free banking era. Define the sample variances S;, 
i = p,f, as the sum of squar&l deviations divided by n - I, where n is the number 
of observations. Let R = Sp/Sfbe the likelihood ratio. In all cases Ho: 02 < a~ 
cannot be rejected at the 5 ~o level as R is well below the critical values. However, 
the alternative hypothesis Hi: ~r 2 > a~ is rejected for all types except for the State 
Branch Banks. Presumably the variance of the circulation to capital ratio in case 
of State Banks was not affected by the introduction of free banking, but the others 
were affected. 
TABLE 1 - SAMPLE STATISTICS OF THE CIRCULATION TO CAPITAL RATIO* 
Type of Bank and Period Number of Sample Mean Sample Variance 
Observations 
Independent Pre 1852 19 1.57 0.0073 
Post 1852 26 1.24 0.1379 
Branch Pre 1852 19 1.72 0.0124 
Post 1852 26 1.72 0.0171 
Old Pre 1852 19 0.78 0.0340 
Post 1852 10 0.65 0.2918 
Free Post 1852 26 1.01 0.0948 
Total Pre 1852 57 1.36 0.0173 
Post 1852 88 1.25 0.1020 
* The data are quarterly observations on aggregate measures of bank notes in circulation to capital 
that cover the two periods 1846-1851 and 1852-1863, except for those quarters for which no data 
were available. The data source is Huntington (1964, pp. 284-286). Data are available from the third 
author upon request. 
While the circulation to capital ratio provides some evidence in favor of an 
increased uncertainty, this variable is not directly related to the variables of the 
proposition and the corollary. The data sources do provide some profit measures, 
but these profits include net earnings from the commercial banking activities, 
thereby contaminating this indicator of seigniorage. As for the note-specific 
debasement rates rc i, no reliable data seem to be available. Therefore, we opted 
for a somewhat roundabout procedure whereby the data of Huntington on circu- 
lation can be used. From equation (3) we have 
B,  = ;~z ,4 ,e  - '= '  . ( I I )  
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Taking logarithms and transforming the result into firstdifferences yields approxi- 
mately 
(12) 
Under the hypothesis that our model of free banking is correct, we find that 
Var(AB,/B,) = Var(n~ - 7An; + Av~/~,.) + Var (A~/~)  
= Var(gq)+ Var(~), (13) 
say. 16 Recall that q~- ~(y, r), and hence Var(e2) represents uncertainty due to 
sources other than strategic reasons, like fluctuations in demand. Moreover, 
Var(e2) is also assumed to cover the uncertainties which stem from the commercial 
banking activities of the banks. On the other hand, Var(el) is entirely due to the 
mixed strategy nature of the free banking equilibrium whereby banks randomize 
over x e. The Cov(~, e2) is zero as the two sources of risk are unrelated, i.e. A (x) 
in (8) does not depend on tp. Also note that Var(el) = 0 for any of the pure strategy 
equilibria, as An~ = 0 and Az~ = 0 in such cases. 
TABLE 2 - TESTS FOR THE EQUALITY OF VOLATILITY IN THE CIRCULATION TO 
CAPITAL RATIO 
Type of Bank R Ratio Critical Values (5~o) 
Ho:4-<4 r 
Independent 0.053 F(18,25) = 2.03 F(18,25) = 0.46 
Branch 0.724 F(18,25) = 2.03 F(18,25) = 0.46 
Old 0.117 F(18,9) = 2.95 F(18,9) = 0.41 
Total 0.170 F(56,87) = 1.50 F(56,87) = 0.66 
The idea is now to exploit equation (13) in order to discriminate between the 
competing models. Maintain the hypothesis that the pre free-banking period was 
essentially a period with local money supply monopolies uch that Var(e~)= O. 
Then, free banking with direct note substitution must have increased Var(AB,/Bi) 
by Var(el), assuming that the other sources of uncertainty did not change, i.e. e 2 
is assumed to be covariance stationary. Table 3 provides the necessary infor- 
mation on the means and variances of ABJB~. In line with the asymmetric 
information model with direct note substitution, the means after deregulation are 
below the means of the pre-deregulation period. Taking expectations in (12) yields 
E(AB,/B,) = E(n,.) + E(Aq~/q~). (14) 
16 Ira> 0, then equation (3') implies that ~1 comprises an additional term: aA~*/~*. 
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The proposition implies for the model with direct note substitution that 
E?(rc,~) = 1/7> Ey(Iti), 
and hence one expects E(ABi/Be) to drop. Moreover, the volatility of AB/B  i 
should go up on the basis of equation (13). In contrast, the model without direct 
note substitution predicts n8 changes in the mean and the variance. A glance at 
Table 3 shows that the evidence supports the former ather than the latter model, 
except for the State Branch Banks. 
TABLE 3 - SAMPLE STATISTICS OF ABi/B~* 
Type of Bank and Period Number of Sample Mean Sample Variance 
Observations 
Independent Pre 1852 18 0.05 0.0078 
Post 1852 25 - 0.04 0.0925 
Branch Pre 1852 18 0.10 0.0173 
Post 1852 25 - 0.01 0.0096 
Old Pre 1852 18 -0.03 0.0423 
Post 1852 8 - 0.77 4.0023 
Free Post 1852 25 0.00 0.0532 
* The ratio ABJB i is computed asAlogB~, and-where B~ are the notes in circulation as reported 
in Huntington (1964, pp. 284-287). 
In Table 4 we formally test whether the increases in the variances ofABi/B e were 
significant. At the 5 ~o significance l vel H o is accepted in all three cases, and H~ 
is rejected for the Independent and Old Banks. However, for the State Branch 
Banks equality of ap and afcannot be rejected. The above evidence suggests that 
the State Branch Banks were not affected by the free banking laws vis-h-vis the 
other banks. This, however, is not the entire story. Given the equality of variances 
for the State Branch Banks, we may test for the equality of the means as well by 
using a t-test. The appropriate hypotheses are Ho: #p =/2f and Hi: #p >/,if. 
Computing the test statistic gives a value of 3.18, which is well above the critical 
value of 1.64 (with 41 degrees of freedom and at the 5~o significance l vel). Hence, 
TABLE 4 - TESTS FOR THE EQUALITY OF VOLATILITY IN THE AB/B 
Type of Bank R Ratio Critical Values (5 ~o )
n0:,:-< n,:4>4 
Independent 
Branch 
Old 
0.084 F(17,24) = 2.07 F(17,24) = 0.46 
1.802 F(17,24) = 2.07 F(17,24) = 0.46 
0.01t F(t7,7) = 3.47 F(17,7) = 0.38 
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H o is strongly rejected in favor of H~, indicating that the State Banks debased at 
a significantly lower rate after free banking was instituted. In summary the scant 
material provides weak support for the asymmetric information and direct note 
substitution model vis-h-vis the model with only indirect note substitution. 
4 CONCLUSIONS 
The aim of this paper was twofold: first, to provide a coherent framework to 
analyze the issue of free banking, and second, to account for some of the stylized 
facts of the free banking era in the U.S. We studied the asymmetric nformation 
direct note substitution model as a vehicle of analysis, as it is able to account for 
the noted increased financial uncertainty for the period. Importantly, this un- 
certainty is more an indication of stability than of instability; the uncertainty arises 
for strategic reasons. 
Given asymmetric information on the demand side and decreasing average 
costs on the supply side, only mixed strategy equilibria are viable Nash equilibria 
if banks compete in 'price,' i.e. the Bertrand feature of the model. The other side 
of the coin is that inflation rates become intrinsically random. But at the same time 
competition does lower the average inflation and seigniorage rates. The framework 
may also be useful for analyzing the British proposals for currency competition 
within the EMS. This could be a potentially interesting project for future research. 
When we tested for the implications of the model by means of free banking data 
for Ohio, both a decline in the mean and an increased volatility were verified for 
the least regulated type of banks. However, for the State Branch Banks, to which 
entry was limited and which operated under a common safety fund, only the mean 
debasement rate seemed to go down significantly. The volatility of the debasement 
rate of these banks was not affected in an upward direction. This suggests that 
the State Banks did not participate in the Bertrand competition because they were 
better secured than the other banks, thus offering a differentiated product. But, 
nevertheless, the State Banks felt the pressure of enhanced competition i  terms 
of a smaller market share. 
APPENDIX 
In this appendix we provide a solution to the problem with variable z;, i.e. using 
(2) and (3'), i.e. if a> 0. For expository reasons we discuss the case ofn = 2 free 
banks and state the solution directly in terms of the equilibrium distribution 
functions F 1 (n) and F2(n ). Expected seigniorage for bank 1 equals 
ES, = .~sm { [ 1 _ F2( rC l ) ]  ffl cx~be - ~ . . . . . .  
+ r~(~l )  ~,/~4~e- .i . . . . .  2 _ K} dr , ( z l )  d r : (~) .  
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Conjecture the following solution: 
c+K 
F 1(/~) = F2(~ ) = __  
- fl a~(a -  fl) /T 
where 
~s m a = e"" dF(n) ,  
c= afl ~e - I  - K ,  
? 
and where s is again implicitly defined through equation (9). Note that this is the 
same distribution function as is discussed in the main text. The only difference is 
the level of expected seigniorage, ES; = c, which differs by a factor a. To verify 
that this indeed constitutes a Nash solution, one first integrates out over rc 2, which 
yields the factor a, then checks that the integrand of ES, is constant over the 
support and that it does not pay to move mass outside the support. 
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Summary 
AN OLIGOPOLY MODEL OF FREE BANKING: THEORY AND TESTS 
The paper demonstrates that in an environment of free banking where some agents have imperfect 
information regarding the circulation and debasement rates of alternative money suppliers, the 
equilibrium supply of money involves mixed strategies. It follows that the circulation and debasement 
rates are intrinsically stochastic, but that their averages are below the rates set by a monopoly bank. 
Empirical tests reveal that these predictions are consistent with the free banking era of the United 
States. The paper is also relevant for the discussion about the future monetary union in the EC. 
